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This paper introduces a multi-modal polymorphic type theory to model epistemic
processes characterized by trust, deﬁned as a second-order relation affecting the communi-
cation process between sources and a receiver. In this language, a set of senders is
expressed by a modal prioritized context, whereas the receiver is formulated in terms of
a contextually derived modal judgement. Introduction and elimination rules for modalities
are based on the polymorphism of terms in the language. This leads to a multi-modal non-
homogeneous version of a type theory, in which we show the embedding of the modal
operators into standard group knowledge operators.
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1. Introduction
This paper introduces a multi-modal type-theoretic system to model trust-qualiﬁed communication processes ongoing
among rational agents. The formulation of such a language and the analysis of its properties contributes to the epistemic
debate on testimony and it provides a novel analysis of trust-based knowledge representation in a multi-agent system.
Provided the syntactic nature of the language, the resulting semantics is easily adapted to computation within distributed
networks: we focus here only on the analogy with testimony relations.
In the epistemic debate, testimony is commonly understood as the assertion of a declarative sentence carrying the
message of a sender (S) to a receiver (R),1 who then accepts it as true, without checking its truthfulness. From an epistemo-
logical point of view, true beliefs acquired through testimony are not (yet) justiﬁed, because they (still) lack any veriﬁcation
of their truthfulness. So it seems that testimony allows the agents in the system only to achieve a weak epistemic status,
whereas a strong epistemic status can be obtained only once the receiver of the message veriﬁes its truthfulness.
The formal model proposed in this paper rests on two conceptual pillars, the deﬁnition of trust as second-order prop-
erty qualifying ﬁrst-order relations [72] and the analysis of testimony proposed in [73]. Before focusing on the analysis of
testimony we shall brieﬂy recall the reader’s attention on the novelty of the deﬁnition of trust as second-order property.
Such deﬁnition clariﬁes that, contrary to what a ﬁrst analysis would suggest, trust is not a relation occurring among the
agents of a system. Rather it is a way in which such relations may occur. In particular, trust qualiﬁes a relation making
it more convenient for the agent who decides to trust (the trustor) another agent (the trustee), as in doing so the trustor
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1 In this paper we will refer to ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ of a message rather than to ‘speaker’ and ‘hearer’ to indicate the agents involved in a testimony
scenario. ‘Speaker’ and ‘hearer’, although common terms in the philosophical literature on testimony, speciﬁcally refer to verbal communication, which is
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epistemic context, this deﬁnition of trust becomes extremely useful in understanding its role in the processes of communi-
cation of information and knowledge among the agents of a distributed system. This is particularly true when considering
the occurrences of testimony. According to the analysis of testimony provided in [73] on the basis of this deﬁnition of trust,
testimony is the occurrence of ﬁrst-order relations of communication qualiﬁed by the second-order property of trust. This
is the deﬁnition interpreted by the formal model described in this paper, which interprets communication in a multi-agent
system by focusing on the distinction among agents that hold directly the relevant information and those that have to
rely on others in order to possess it. In this way, we design communication chains that inherently use the notion of trust,
deﬁned as the result of linking two epistemic states by way of a message passing system.
Our language is an extension of the modal polymorphic type theory with partial term-assignment on judgements de-
veloped in [65]. The polymorphic language serves the task of formalizing the two kinds of epistemic states involved by a
communication act: a standard constructive type preserves veriﬁcation-terms on propositions and qualiﬁes them as ‘known
contents’; a type with partial-terms typeinf preserves only consistency and qualiﬁes its contents as ‘information’, in the sense
of communicated but not veriﬁed contents. For each of the two kinds of contents, an appropriate portion of the language
is used. A side property of the system is the extension of a strongly constructive language with a fragment that accommo-
dates a weaker epistemic notion, to use it for knowledge representation purposes. The language has also a modal extension,
based on the judgemental modalities introduced in [64]: judgements /(A true) are deﬁned to express the reducibility of
the corresponding proof constructions. Modalities are then generalized to collections of judgements used in contexts Γ,,
interpreted as knowledge states. Multi-modalities are used to formalize the occurrence of distinct, prioritized sources in the
communication act.
We can sum up the novelties offered by the present contribution as follows:
1. We present the ﬁrst type-theoretic model of trusted communications; in this way we extend the range of syntactic
approaches to group knowledge and provide a novel research direction for type systems;
2. The model relies on an effective representation of different epistemic states for rational agents, thus making an effort
in the direction of realistic representation of human knowledge processes;
3. The model endorses an innovative deﬁnition of trust. Rather than focusing on the traditional conceptualization of trust
as a relation, it endorses a recently provided account of this phenomenon, according to which trust is a second-order
property qualifying ﬁrst-order relations. Such a deﬁnition not only constitutes quite an innovative approach to the
analysis of trust when compared to the relevant literature, it also allows for developing a completely new analysis
of trust-communications and of their role in the processes of knowledge communication in a distributed system, as
described in Section 2.
4. We make use of the notion of refutable content for a type system, introduced in [65]; we consider this a crucial notion
for the development of epistemic logics for defeasible reasoning and, in particular, consider it especially important in
its present combination with a strong veriﬁcationist semantics, in order to combine different aspects of knowledge
acquisition processes that often are diﬃcult to highlight in a formal setting;
5. Finally, we explore the relation of this syntactic model and the thereby deﬁned notion of trusted communications with
the well-known notions of Distributed and Common Knowledge from epistemic logic; this direction of research is still
very young but we provide a ﬁrst interesting connection between two ﬁelds that grow largely separated from one
another.
There is a growing literature on trust and the formalization of communication acts that uses modal logics; such literature is
for the greatest part developed in the vein of model-theoretic, Kripke- and Dynamic semantics of modal logics, whereas little
is done in the area of proof-theoretic approaches. Our work especially aims at providing the ﬁrst type-theoretic treatment of
the notion of trusted communication. The greatest advantage of such language is that it provides a syntax with embedded
meanings, so that its rules immediately deﬁne corresponding semantic notions and a procedural semantics comes entirely
natural, as done in [66] for a model of safe distributed programming. Moreover, we exploit the predicative structure of
Dependent Types in order to mimic the behavior of communication acts. This approach is, to our knowledge, entirely new
especially because it relies on a syntactic distinction between constructors that accommodate partial terms. Finally, we
induce a modal extension of the language which differs both from the original formulation of the type theory in use and
from the already existing contextual modal extensions.
In providing this language, we focus on the concurrent combination of the two epistemic states that we consider es-
sentially involved in the act of trusted communication. Also in this case, we believe this is a rather novel approach. The
largest part of the work done in modeling trusted communications and distrust relations comes from computer science and
network analysis, where such distinction is treated in terms of authorizations. Our treatment is clearly more focused on the
epistemic relations occurring among rational human agents. The formal representation of epistemic acts combining weaker
and stronger attitudes represents a step forward towards more realistic approaches of human-based communications.
As mentioned above, a conceptual novelty of this paper is related to the deﬁnition of trust as a second-order property and
the reference to testimony as the speciﬁc instance of trusted communications. This point is largely addressed in Section 2.
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cally deﬁned) notions of Common and Distributed Knowledge are provided, something we believe will be crucial in future
directions of this research.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical and philosophical background on which the formal
model rests. Section 3 introduces the formal model, ﬁrst in view of the non-modal fragment of the type-theoretic system
and then via its extension to modalities and multi-modalities. Section 4 clariﬁes the structure of our language as a non-
homogeneous multi-modal logic to express reliable communication and knowledge within the spectrum of standard modal
logics. Section 5 shows how to infer appropriate deﬁnitions of Distributed and Common Knowledge from our language.
Section 6 presents completeness results of the syntactic language with respect to frames of standard modal logics. Section 7
describes the debates that stand at the background of this research: a) the epistemic debate on testimony, b) the existing
formal approaches to trusted communication relations in knowledge representation and information systems. Finally, Sec-
tion 8 concludes the paper by pulling together the threads of our analysis and it brieﬂy describes the content of future
work.
2. Testimony: the case of trusted communications among the agents of a distributed system
In a testimony scenario, R accepts a message by S on the basis of R ’s trust in S . R is the trustor, who accepts S ’
message as true without verifying it and only on the basis of his trust in S , while S is the trustee: she is the referent of R ’s
trust. According to this analysis, the occurrences of trust are related to, and affect, pre-existing relations, like purchasing,
negotiation, delegation and, in our case, communication. Trust is not to be considered a relation itself but a property of
relations, something that changes the way relations occur. As a property of relations, trust affects the way relations occur
by minimizing the trustor’s effort and commitment for the achievement of a given goal. It does so in two ways. First, the
trustor can avoid performing the action necessary to achieve his goal himself, because he can count on the trustee to do it
(or have done it). This is true even in epistemic contexts in which the trustor, e.g. a member of a jury, could not physically
replace the trustee, e.g. an eyewitness. Second, the trustor can decide not to supervise the trustee’s performance. This is a
peculiarity of trust scenarios as shown in [72], where the trustor decides to delegate and not supervise the performance of
a given task to a trustworthy agent.2 It follows that trust can be deﬁned thus:
Deﬁnition 1 (Trust). Assume a set of ﬁrst-order relations functional to the achievement of a goal. Assume that one such
relation holds between two agents, such that one of them (the trustor) has to achieve the given goal while the other (the
trustee) is able to perform some tasks in order to achieve that goal. If the trustor chooses to achieve his goal through
the task performed by the trustee, and if the trustor considers the trustee a trustworthy agent, then the relation has the
property of being advantageous for the trustor. Such a property is a second-order property called trust that affects the
ﬁrst-order relations occurring between agents.3
We shall endorse this deﬁnition of trust to analyze the ﬁrst-order relation of communication of epistemic contents among
agents, namely what is known as testimony. In a testimony scenario, S transmits some information to R ,4 so testimony is
an instance of communication, a ﬁrst-order relation. This is a partial deﬁnition, because it does not take into consideration
other aspects of testimony, such as the goal of R of obtaining (at least) some information by counting on the performance
of S , and the absence of supervision on S ’ performances. We focus on the fact that R does not verify the truthfulness of
S ’ messages, nor does she verify how S elaborated the transmitted information. Following this analysis, testimony can be
deﬁned thus:
Deﬁnition 2 (Testimony). Assume a ﬁrst-order ternary relation of communication, where some information i is passed from
a sender S to a receiver R . If the communication occurs between a receiver and a trustworthy sender, and if the receiver
acquires the sender’s messages without checking their truthfulness, then the communication is affected by the second-order
property of trust. Such an occurrence of communication is called testimony.
2 Trustworthiness is a measure of the probability that the trustee is able to perform a given action correctly and autonomously. The criteria for the
assessment of trustworthiness vary from case to case, and may or may not be rational or objective. The level of risk undertaken by the trustor will increase
in those cases in which trustworthiness is assessed on the basis of non-rational criteria. It is worth noting that the formal model we present describes
communications among rational agents, hence we assume that the agents of the presented model will rationally choose the potential trustee on the basis
of their reputation, but the execution of such selection is not a task of the formal model itself. This assumption avoids the problem of a possible stronger
requirement on the deﬁnition of the trust relation, such as that the trustee must be trustworthy. An example of a general system to evaluate trustworthiness
in actions such as negotiations, pacts and trading networks is given in [70]: it provides an information theoretic approach where the employed notion of
trust measures the relationship between commitment and execution of contracts being given as the negative entropy of the probability distribution of
possible outcomes for a given contract.
3 See [72] for the analysis in support of this deﬁnition.
4 For an analysis of the nature of the message transmitted in a testimony scenario, see [73] and [45].
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not speciﬁed. We consider the information communicated by the sender as meaningful contents to which truth is ascribed
(rather than true contents), but which can still be falsiﬁed (mis-information). We call such content functional information.
To make things clearer, consider a case of communication. The aim of this paper is to provide a formal counterpart to
the notion of testimony introduced above and to present the appropriate formal properties of the notion of communication
as exempliﬁed below.
Over a hundred biologists are writing together an article on molecular biology. None of them knows enough to ground
the overall conclusion of the paper, so none of them can be given a ‘strong epistemic status’ with respect to the whole
information conveyed in the article. But, eventually, each of them provides the part of content for which she is able
to support justiﬁcation. In the context of their interaction various communication acts are in place: biologist a will
communicate to her colleague b the content of message M , which b does not posses nor is able to test, so that b ‘trusts’
a about the actual truth of M . These relations are what we shall call ‘trusted communications’ (see Deﬁnition 17): a
trusted communication is a ternary relation between the epistemic states of agents a,b and the judgement A true that
is content of the communicated message.5
According to the analysis in [73], the receiver of the message is in a weak epistemic status, as she accepts the message to be
true on the basis of her trust in the sender and without verifying it. The formal model expresses this aspect by representing
the epistemic content held by the receiver as a hypothesis (h), i.e. an epistemic content that is admissibly true but has not
been veriﬁed yet. The weak status resulting from possessing content via a trusted communication is what we shall formalize
by terms of the typeinf -kind and express by the induced -modality, see Section 3.3 and Deﬁnition 12.
The message-passing system is deﬁned by functional expressions of the language, in terms of dependent types. For each
expression B dependent on A in the language, we enforce the presence of an agent a which passes content A to an agent
b which holds content B true given she accepts A. We will say that there is a hierarchical relation among a and b provided
the receiver of the message is considered dependent from the sender with respect to this message. This communication
becomes in turn trust-qualiﬁed, as b does not possess any means to verify A, but uses it to hold B true. The veriﬁcation of
the message is represented in the formal model by the reduction of h to a term via β-reduction. An agent is said to have a
strong epistemic status regarding h when she can account for such content without relying on any other agent in the system.
This strong status is what we shall formalize by means of terms of the type-kind and express by the induced -modality,
see Section 3.2 and Deﬁnition 12. As the content justiﬁed by agent a can in turn be based on some other content obtained
by a via trusted communication from agent a− 1, we will say that there is a hierarchy of trusted communications between
agents b < a < a−1. The hierarchical structure of our agents seems to induce a very strong acyclic message-passage system,
which would ban any receiver of a given communication act to ever be the sender in any other communication act involving
the same agents. This possibly problematic issue is resolved by understanding that the hierarchical relation among agents
is only induced by the dependency relation of contents involved in the message-passing system: it is the dependency of
content B from content A that makes agent b hierarchically dependent on agent a and thus let us say that a trust relation
of b from a holds with respect to content A. The hierarchical relation might well be reversed with respect to some other
content C .
Coming back to our biologists, looking at the whole interactions, their result form Distributed Knowledge (DK , Theo-
rem 1): the content of the paper can be inferred from what each and all the biologists together know. For the content of
this distributed state to become actually knowledge for each of them, it is necessary that the veriﬁcation process that vali-
dates a content is checkable and admissible to any peer. In the formal system this requires a notion of veriﬁcation valid over
contexts, which we shall interpret in terms of canonical proof-objects. As a result, direct veriﬁcation of a content by each
agent formally corresponds to removal of any trust relation (Theorem 2) and, in turn, the attaining of Common Knowledge
(CK , Theorem 3).6
Our epistemic model deals therefore with different sorts of justiﬁcations in order to represent qualitative differences
among epistemic states. A strong notion of veriﬁcation is used to deﬁne a ‘strong epistemic state’ and this naturally re-
calls the Platonic notion of ‘justiﬁed true belief’. The very same analogy has been put forward in Justiﬁcation Logic, see
e.g. [2,5], in which a language based on classical propositional logic is augmented by justiﬁcation assertions t : F that read
‘t is a justiﬁcation for F ’. Justiﬁcation Logic assumes certain justiﬁcation principles originating from both mainstream epis-
temology and the mathematical theory of proofs and use them to analyze a deﬁnition of knowledge relying on the fact
that every valid principle of modal logics of knowledge such as T , S4, and S5 has a counterpart in it. The similarity of
5 As our formal expression always looks at the content of messaging at the Receiver state, the model formalizes a delivery system in which communi-
cations are always successful. This would suggest that our analysis focuses only on the cases of query-triggered testimony. Nevertheless, the conceptual
understanding of testimony remains neutral with this respect.
6 This latter logical requirement induces a further diﬃculty with respect to real-based situations: the trustor behaves as a complete ignorant with respect
to the trustee’s veriﬁcation, which puts the relation of trusted communication among scientists from related areas on a par with the same relation between
an expert and a layman. The trustor needs in both cases to show additional competences in order to be able to reconstruct the veriﬁcation initially
grounding the trustee’s information. This may be practically diﬃcult to attain in the case of trusted communications between an expert and a layman.
Nonetheless, from a logical point of view, admissibility of a proof-object at each index is a formal requirement that guarantees proofs are canonical.
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Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov semantics (see [3]), whereas the constructive version of Type Theory explicitly refers to the
realizability models of the very same semantics, according to the distinction that goes back to [42]. Nonetheless, major
differences can be identiﬁed between the two approaches. In the ﬁrst place, Justiﬁcation Logic embeds the notion of justi-
ﬁcation into a classical logic propositional framework and therefore it also exploits the characteristic semantic treatment of
related epistemic notions such as common and distributed knowledge. Secondly, it entirely misses the notion of dependent
construction that is typical of the predicative format of Intuitionistic Type Theory and which is here exploited to deﬁne trust
relations syntactically. Finally, and precisely on the basis of the previous point, it does not allow a polymorphic language as
the one we will present in the next section, which allows us to deﬁne at the same time a stronger and a weaker epistemic
state, and to characterize trusted communications as a relation among the two.
In Section 7 we shall refer extensively to the large number of other formal approaches that deal with the issue of
trust and we will see how the greatest part of this literature presents semantic approaches, mostly pivoted on the use of
Kripke semantics for modal logics. In the following, we will introduce one syntactic approach which we believe is worth
exploring on its own. As explained above, it gives a ﬁne-grained analysis of the relation between agent and content, making
it possible to distinguish among different epistemic states. In doing so, it proves well-behaving in analyzing interesting
properties for communication acts. Most importantly, our language is already in predicative form, whereas other semantic
treatments mostly deal with propositional languages. Finally, it presents the advantage that it can be easily interpreted into
machine-language via a translation to a procedural semantics, as mentioned in Section 7. Moreover, we do not know of any
other formal treatment that so explicitly connects to the literature in epistemology for the problem of testimony under the
reading we are proposing, where an act of testimony is understood as a ﬁrst-order relation of communication characterized
by the second-order property of trust.
3. A type theory for multi-agents epistemic processes
The constructive version of type theory (CTT)7 admits objects as constructors deﬁning types, hence the semantics entirely
relies on the syntax of the language. In this paper, the standard syntax of CTT is extended as to accommodate indices on
terms and variables constructors. Sets of indexed term constructors ai,b j, . . . and variable constructors xi, y j, . . . are used,
so that each is a constructor for an appropriate type A, B, . . . and i, j ∈ G range over an enumerable set G of distinct
sources or agents. We call these indices the signatures of the sources. Our types are propositions and each type is justiﬁed
by a source-dependent construction, i.e. a signed construction. A message can always be taken to be passed from an agent
to herself, as she trust her own assumption to formulate a given expression. In this case the expression contains only one
index, G reduces to a singleton and the language to the mono-modal case.
An indexed term constructor ai for type A is intended as the veriﬁcation with signature (issued by source or agent) i
that makes A a justiﬁed claim. The type-theoretic formula ai : A can be understood as expressing that a type A is presented
with a name a for its proof-variable signed by its issuer i. Computationally, this corresponds to a term for which usual
α-conversion applies. It will be ensured later on by the modal extension of the system that proof terms are treated as
canonical within a group of signatures.
An indexed variable constructor xi for a type A is intended as the consistently admissible but unveriﬁed claim of the
truth A with signature (issued by source or agent) i. The type-theoretic formula xi : A can be understood as expressing
that a type A is admitted or assumed by agent i: the computational explanation of this notion of assumption is based on
a proof-variable for which no appropriate substitution is executed, but admissible. As this implies that a β-redex for A is
possible, then by deﬁnition we are working with formulas that are not in normal form and with non-canonical terms. Also
this property will be expressible by an appropriate modal extension of the language.
A single non-atomic formula can be obtained by distinctly signed terms or variable constructors. This happens according
to two distinct cases, each involving one of the atomic types of the language. Where a formula is categorical and constructed
out of proof-constructors ai,b j , it will be possible to sign it by either i or j, or both. Where a variable xi is involved in a
dependent construction performed under signature j, the obtained formula will be signed by both signatures i, j, but not
separately. To express these properties, the modal extension of the language will apply to contextual judgements as well,
inducing the deﬁnition of modal contexts and leading to appropriate counterparts of Common and Distributed Knowledge.8
3.1. The non-modal fragment for functional information
Let us start by deﬁning the non-modal fragment of our language and giving it a sensible interpretation. Our alphabet is
built by introducing the kinding:
7 See [49,50]; see also [59] for an introduction oriented towards computer scientists and [62] for a more logico-philosophical perspective.
8 The formal treatment of contextual reasoning and the dynamics of contexts originating in natural deduction calculi and inherited in the stronger format
of constructive logic embedded in Martin-Löf’s Type Theory is further analyzed in its natural language interpretation in [67]. The multi-contextual approach
underlying our model recalls well-known research in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, see [51,29,30], which eventually led to the propositional logic and ﬁrst-order
logic of context, see [15,14]; [68] provides a general method for designing multi-contextual logics with agents. Recently a newly formulated semantics for
constructive contextual K has been given in [53].
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K := {(A, B, . . . type); (A, B, . . . typeinf )
}
where type is the kind of all justiﬁed knowledge claims deﬁned by term constructors, and typeinf is the kind of all com-
municable information chunks deﬁned by variable constructors. Elements of typeinf can be used to deﬁne elements in type.
The objects in K are next deﬁned via the set of terms:
Deﬁnition 4 (The set of terms). The set of terms T = {C,V} is given by the set of constructors for terms
C := {ai; (ai,b j);ai(b j);λ
(
ai(b j)
); 〈ai,b j〉
};
and the set of variables for terms
V := {xi;
(
xi(b j)
); (xi(b j)
)
(ai)
}
.
So terms can be respectively:
• ai – an inhabitant or constructor of our basic kind type;
• (ai,b j) – a pair of constructors;
• ai(b j) – an application of constructors;
• λ(ai(b j)) – an abstraction of constructors;
• 〈ai,b j〉 – an ordered pair of constructors;
• xi – a constructor for our basic kind typeinf ;
• (xi(b j)) – an abstraction of a variable w.r.t. a constructor;
• (xi(b j))(ai) – the application of an abstracted variable to a type constructor.
Two remarks are needed here: ﬁrst, variables in this language are not just abstractions from term constructors, rather
separate terms on their own to construct the kind of typeinf ; second, as our modalities are purely judgemental, T does not
contain modal terms, as it is the case with other systems.9 We now look at contexts.
Deﬁnition 5 (Contexts). A context is the set of assumptions under which a given constructor can be formulated. We construct
contexts in the following way:
1. A type-theoretic expression xi : A is an assumption with xi ∈ T and A typeinf ; an assumption is the declaration that a
source or agent i assumes an admissible construction for type A, which is then declared to be true.
2. A context Γ is a ﬁnite sequence of assumptions {xi : A, . . . , xn : N}, all with distinct subjects. Each assumption in Γ
depends on previous assumptions in the same context, i.e. each xi : α depends on the assumptions from x1 : α up to
xi−1 : α, where α stands for a metavariable in K.
3. If Γ = {xi : A, . . . , xn : N}, an extended context  = {Γ, xn+1 : N + 1} corresponds to  = {xi : A, . . . , xn+1 : N + 1}. When
the declaration of a freshly introduced variable xn+1 : N + 1 is meant to be independent of the order of declarations
in Γ , we introduce it following a separation sign as follows: Γ | xn+1 : N + 1. A judgement dependent on a context of
assumptions J [xi : A, . . . , xn : N], means that J type holds given the substitution [xi/ai : α] of each xi with a certain ai
in α.
Standardly, contexts Γ = {x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An} are built according to the requirement that wants the list of expressions
in contexts to contain all distinct subjects. The structure of contexts in our language differs in the obvious sense that
expressions with variables contained in a context are now made distinct by their signature from the set T . Hence, we
cannot just ensure that all signatures are different, because one single signature might be attached to different contents in
the same context. We require instead explicitly the use of distinct elements in K for each expression in a context.10
We extend now our syntax with semantic judgements, considering two distinct truth predicates induced by our kinds:
Deﬁnition 6 (Semantic judgements for K). The kinding K induces truth deﬁnitions as follows:
ai : A
Truth Deﬁnition
A true
A typeinf xi : A
Hypothetical Truth Deﬁnition.
A true∗
9 See e.g. the languages presented in [56,55].
10 This in turn implies the simpliﬁcation that wants redundant information to be avoided within a context.
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Let us analyze the rules for this non-modal fragment of our language. Typing for the ﬁrst element in K gives the ﬁrst
basic axiom of the system:
Deﬁnition 7 (Axiom for type).  type : K.
We need now to explain how to construct objects within the kind type based on constructions by signed terms ai,b j .
Within this kind, we have a few construction steps: what is usually functional abstraction reduces to application; gen-
eralization by ∀-introduction and speciﬁcation by ∃-introduction are restricted to enumerable constructors and without
abstraction; a negation introduction is admissible by type checking on the enumerable constructions. The standard start
rule is reformulated as a rule to introduce a premise; usual structural rules are easily deﬁned for this fragment.
Deﬁnition 8 (Rules for type). The rules for signed expressions in the kind type are:
ai : A
Type Formation
A type
ai : A b j : B
I∧
(ai,b j) : A ∧ B
ai : A A true  b j : B
I →
ai(b j) : A → B
a1 : A, . . . ,an : A A true  b j : B λ((ai(b j))A, B)
I∀
(∀ai : A)B type
a1 : A, . . . ,an : A ai : A  b j : B (〈ai,b j〉, A, B)
I∃
(∃ai : A)B type
ai : A
I⊥¬A → ⊥
Premise Rule
Γ,ai : A,  A true
Γ  B type Γ  A type
Weakening
Γ | ai : A  B type
Γ | ai : A,b j : B  C type Γ  b j : B
Contraction
Γ | ai : A  C type
Γ | ai : A,b j : B  C type
Exchange
Γ | b j : B,ai : A  C type
The structural rules can be interpreted as follows, with Γ, possibly empty contexts. The Premise Rule corresponds to a
Global Validity Rule: if the truth of A is generated at source i by veriﬁcation, its validity is global to the relevant G to which
i belongs. This property is obviously crucial to induce the desired canonical proof-terms, and important to validate the other
structural rules. Weakening says that the external addition of a premise to the context of a truth is possible (but ineffective
with respect to its value). Contraction says that if a context Γ includes a premise at an external source j, then what holds
for Γ and the external premise at j, holds at Γ . Exchange says that the order of external premises is not relevant (whereas
it will be for assumptions in a context, under the fragment for typeinf ). Notice that the validity of Weakening, Contraction
and Exchange is restricted to external premises, i.e. for additional sources not within a context but attached to a context,
for which we use the separator | after the contexts. This is because by Deﬁnition 5, assumptions in a context come with a
strict order relation, such that each element depends on previous ones: this imposes that addition or exchange of premises
do not interfere with such order.
3.3. Axioms and rules for typeinf
The new inhabitant for our kinding, namely typeinf , requires speciﬁc typing and formation rules, based on our notion
of legal assumption. We state the ability of a user or source i ∈ G to generate a legal assumption for A whenever in the
enumerable set of multi-indexed constructions available to G , no declaration A → ⊥ is construed. The weak constructive
nature of this principle recalls Kolmogorov’s notion of pseudo-truth introduced in [43]. The admissibility rule for the typeinf
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are treated intensionally being subject only to α-conversion; terms are treated extensionally, being additionally subject to β
and η-conversion.11
Deﬁnition 9 (Axiom for typeinf ).  typeinf : K.
Constructors for typeinf are restricted to interpret the function formation rule. The construction for typeinf is based on
a missing refutation for the corresponding type, i.e. it is conﬁgured as double negation introduction, without elimination.
The β-conversion rule expresses substitution of an open variable with a value constructor, i.e. it constructs an appropriate
value for a non-contradicting assumption, representing the reduction to type. An α-conversion rule expresses substitution,
by the obvious inductive deﬁnition, of an instance of value constructor for a signed variable on a ﬁnite domain of equivalent
constructors, constructing a function among those deﬁning a class of dependent types.
Deﬁnition 10 (Rules for typeinf ). The rules for signed expressions in the kind typeinf are:
¬(A → ⊥) type
typeinf Formation
A typeinf
A typeinf b j : B[xi : A]
Functional abstraction
((xi)b j) : A ⊃ B true
A typeinf b j : B[xi : A] ai : A
β-conversion
(x(b j))(ai) = b[a/x] : B type[a/x]
λ((a1−i(b j))A, B) (b j)[ai := a]
α-conversion
(ai(b j)) : A → B
Hypothesis Rule
Γ, xi : A,  A true∗
Γ  B typeinf xi : A  A typeinf
Weakening
Γ | xi : A  B typeinf
Γ | xi : A, y j : B  C typeinf Γ  y j : B
Contraction
Γ | xi : A  C typeinf
Γ | xi : A | y j : B  C typeinf
Exchange
Γ | y j : B | xi : A, C typeinf
The structural rules can be interpreted as follows. The Hypothesis Rule is a Local Validity Rule: if the truth of A depends
on a legal assumption at source i, its validity is bound (starred) to that point in G , until discharged (by β-conversion).
Weakening says that the addition of a legal hypothesis external to the context of a starred truth is possible (but ineffective
with respect to its value). Contraction says that if a context Γ includes a legal assumption at source j, then what holds
for Γ and the explicit external formulation of the assumption at j, holds at Γ . Exchange says that the order of external
assumptions is not relevant. Notice that in this case, validity of the structural rules is restricted to assumptions that are not
in a relation order within a context (presence of the context separator in the Exchange Rule).
3.4. The multi-modal fragment: reasoning about collective knowledge
The aim of the present section is to introduce modal operators in order to generalize the formulation of available judge-
ments. From Deﬁnition 5 of context and the construction of our alphabet, modalities are deﬁned on the basis of the different
kinds. If all subformulae in a dependent expression have the same index, our language reduces to the mono-modal polymor-
phic type theory presented in [65]. Otherwise, the machinery for a multi-modal language needs to be developed, with the
11 The Lax modality deﬁned in a propositional intuitionistic logic in [23] has also similar properties: the modal formula ◦φ expresses the inhabitation of
φ in the context of a number of assumptions holding in a stronger theory; the theory designs two distinct and dual contexts: one where the formula is
true only in certain worlds where appropriate constraints hold, the other only where constraints are false. The former is the partial element lifting and the
latter the exception lifting for the type formula φ at hand. See [23, p. 65]. Our double-negated typing might be seen as a way of admitting the ﬁrst kind of
constraints, up to proving that the second kind holds.
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the language is homogeneous or heterogeneous). With the multi-modalities, derivability in context generates different forms
of collective knowledge of a judgement J under a multi-modal context Σ .
We start from considering a judgement Γ  J . The validity of J depending on the (ordered) list of assumptions in Γ for-
malizes an assumption-based reasoning process from declarations generated by multiple agents {i, . . . ,n} ∈ G all occurring
in Γ . Ordering the declarations in Γ expresses the fact that these are not independent typing declarations, rather there is
a strict order relation among signed assumptions.12 We are therefore describing the structure of a process in which each
agent i communicates a message φ that another agent j lower in the list (i < j) takes as a reliable message. Each such com-
munication is expressed as the function that makes φ valid at j provided it is valid at i. When the communication involves
more that one content φ or more than two agents i < j < k, we express the state at k dependently from the extension of a
context Γi by a context  j .13
Whereas in standard modal logics, operators are deﬁned by the corresponding accessibility relations on worlds; we
induce them from the (local) validity of hypotheses, simulating update on epistemic conditions from the validity of some
propositional truth. The basic idea is to express the validity of a proposition within such context, and to use modalities to
deﬁne the possible extension of such validity under accessibility of other contexts: necessity is explained as validity in all
contexts and possibility as validity in some contexts. The role of the accessibility relation among contexts is played by a
context extension function, which can be seen as a form of contextual weakening14:
Γ  A true
Context Extension
Γ |   A true
The justiﬁcation of the main judgement A true determines if all or some contexts  extending the relevant context Γ are
valid, where both Γ, can be taken to be empty. In the ﬁrst case, if any  extending a context Γ preserves A true, it means
Γ  a : A holds and eventually Γ = ∅. This holds provided that: (1) according to Deﬁnition 5, any declaration in Γ has its
corresponding β-redex and so it is in normal form; and (2) no non-monotonic extension by a typeinf term is possible with
respect to constructors in Γ . In the second case, if A true is valid under some non-empty Γ containing typeinf expressions,
only some of the extensions of the latter context will keep the judgement A true valid. In this sense, the weakening
Γ  A true∗
Local Context Extension
Γ |   A true
is possible iff  provides no redex falsifying some (xi : α) ∈ Γ . This means that the extension by a predicate true∗ is not
necessarily monotonic, and hence the inference holds under some but not all context extensions. This explanation gives the
following deﬁnition of simple or global contextual validity under extension:
Deﬁnition 11 (Validity under contextual extension). A type A derivable in a context Γ |  holds as follows:
1. The judgement J = A true is justiﬁed by [xi/ai] : A in context Γ , i.e. its construction is in normal form in Γ and it
remains valid under any extension Γ | ; then A is said to be globally valid under Γ | ;
2. The judgement J = A true∗ is justiﬁed by xi : A in context Γ , i.e. its construction contains all needed open variables
but is not in normal form in Γ or in some extension Γ | ; then A is said to be locally valid under Γ | .
The notion of global validity holds obviously for categorical judgements as special cases of contextual global validity
under empty contexts: by deﬁnition with Γ = ∅, it holds that ∅  A true ⇒ Γ  A true, for any Γ . The context extension
operation allows for mimicking syntactically the notion of accessibility on worlds, so that judgemental modal operators
express that a proof holds somewhere or everywhere, with respect to contexts.15
We inherit now modal judgements from indexed constructors, to express single-agent modes of validity:
Deﬁnition 12 (Modal judgements). The set of modal judgements M for any i ∈ G is deﬁned by the following modal formation
rules:
ai : A -Formationi(A true)
xi : A -Formationi(A true)
12 The counterpart strategy amounts to collecting distinct and equally ordered indexed contexts (eventually singletons), when we want to express that the
different sources are not prioritized. This is the strategy pursued for the mono-modal version in [65].
13 Our model simulates a reliable message delivery systems, see [24], where for each agent holding a content true there is an effective communication chain
towards her (but in our case not necessarily from her), meaning that for each content that is known, it is also transmitted. We shall further develop this
analogy, in particular to show the holding of properties involved by the usual deﬁnitions of Common and Distributed Knowledge.
14 In a comparison with the standard modal explanation, one would say that the validity of A is indistinguishable from the point of view of contexts Γ
and .
15 Our distinction between terms and modal operators is technically the same distinction that it is obtained in [55] by distinguishing between variables
for different kind of hypotheses and labels to refer to locations of such constructors. We can directly use modalities because we deﬁne them as judgement
rather than propositional operators, hence they apply to processes rather than to speciﬁcations.
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normal form) generated by source i, then it will be valid with respect to any context accessible from i (i.e. under any
context that extends the empty context of i); i(A true) says that if A is declared true by a legal assumption (constructor
in non-normal form) generated by source i, then it will be locally valid with respect to some context accessible from i. We
want now to make explicit this hidden reference to contextually accessible modal judgements:
Deﬁnition 13 (Signed and modal contexts). A signed modal context is construed as follows:
1. If all declarations in context Γ are signed by index i, we indicate it as Γi = {xi : A, . . . , xi : N} (where all subjects
{A, . . . ,N} ∈ typeinf are distinct);
2. Given an expression xi : A by the rule of -Formation we obtain the expression i(A true), which declares that A is a
type valid for some extension of context Γi ;
3. Given a construction ai available for the explicit substitution [xi/ai] : A by the rule of -Formation we obtain the
expression i(A true), which declares that A is a type valid for any extension of context Γi ;
4. For any context Γi , if there is at least one A ∈ Γ such that i(A true), we infer iΓ ;
5. For any context Γi , if for all A ∈ Γ it holds i(A true), we infer iΓ .
By the ﬁrst clause in this deﬁnition, a signed context Γi behaves like a standard context where all declarations are
generated at the same source; by the second and the third clause each declaration in a context Γi can be transformed in
the appropriate modal counterpart by the corresponding modal Formation rule; by the fourth clause a context containing
all boxed assumptions becomes a boxed context; by the ﬁfth clause the presence of a locally valid assumption makes the
corresponding context a locally valid one.
3.5. Extension to multi-modalities
Now that deﬁnitions for modal contexts with a unique index have been formulated, each context can be deﬁned further
by allowing differently indexed modalities to interact with one another. This is obtained by extending a signed (modal)
context ◦Γi in view of a differently signed (modal) context ◦ j . This extension is meant to allow judgements of the form
(1) GΓ k(A true)
(2) GΓ k(A true)
where G = {i, . . . , j} and j < k. The modal dependency deﬁned by these formulas allows for different interpretations: for-
mulas of the type (1) say that “A is a message accepted as true by agent k, trusting the information Γ received from
agent i to agent j ∈ G”, where i  j  k is a strict order relation; formulas of the type (2) rely on actual veriﬁcation of
the involved contextual formulae, resulting in an epistemic expression where the trust relation is no longer necessary. We
shall consider which of the typical bridging axioms for normal multi-modal logics ﬁt best the composition of such two
interpretations.
In the ﬁrst place we have to deﬁne the construction rule for ◦GΓ , where ◦ = {,}. The role of contexts is primarily
that of formalizing information communication acts and the inner order of their structure simulates the strict order relation
of trust among agents. The modalities preﬁxing a context will dictate the nature of any epistemic state valid under such
a context. A consistency constraint is intuitively satisﬁed as follows: it is impossible for an extension iΓ | ◦ j to be
such that i(A true) holds and the extension x j : A → ⊥ being admitted; iΓ | ◦ j allows instead any extension by
deﬁnition of typeinf present in Γ . (Here and in the following Γ, are always sets, whereas Σ is always a multiset and J
on the right-hand side of the derivability relation is meant to be a place holder for any derivable judgement of the form
(A true).)
Deﬁnition 14 (Extension of signed and modal contexts). An extended signed modal context is construed as follows:
1. A multi-modal context Σi, j is a context extension
◦iΓ | ◦ j =
{◦i(A true), . . . ,◦i(N true),◦ j(O true)
};
where ◦ = {;} and the set of signatures used in Σi, j are abbreviated as ΣG ;
2. A context extension ◦iΓ | ◦ j is admissible if, for any judgement J ∈  such that J = A typeinf , Γ  (A → ⊥);
3. A multi-modal context ΣG is preﬁxed by an appropriate multi-modal operator G or G following appropriate coun-
terparts of instruction items 4 and 5 of Deﬁnition 13;
4. The type-theoretic expression GΣ  J is thus obtained by
iΓ | j  J
and it expresses the local validity of J from source i and j by information available at source j accessed from source i;
the content of J remains unveriﬁed, and hence refutable, at some further point k;
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iΓ | j  J
and it expresses the global validity of J from source i and j, in view of the information that source j makes available
when accessed from source i; the content of J remains veriﬁed, hence irrefutable, at any further point k.
By this deﬁnition, a multi-modal context is the extension of mono-modal contexts (given eventually by singletons) with
an accordingly modiﬁed signature. The informal reading of the formula ◦iΓ | ◦ j is that a communication process about
information contained in J happens from the agent or source i to agent or source j, for i  j ∈ G .
We can now deﬁne modal derivability from multi-modal contexts, i.e. where now we admit a context to include an
enumerable number of distinct signatures G = {1, . . . ,n}16:
Deﬁnition 15 (Modal judgements frommulti-signed contexts). Modal judgements are derived from multi-modal signed contexts
according to the following cases:
• k(A true) iff for all Γ j ∈ Context, ∅ | jΓ k(A true), where j =⋃{1, . . . ,k − 1} ∈ G;
• k(A true) iff for some Γi, j ∈ Context, iΓ | j k(A true), where j =⋃{1, . . . ,k − 1} ∈ G .
Our next aim is to evaluate multi-modal contextual derivations and to explore the resulting properties. It will be shown
how evaluation on information communicated under trust results in knowledge formation (common and distributed).
4. From reliable Communication to Knowledge
The interpretation of modal derivability for our type-theoretic language in terms of reliable communication and knowl-
edge will start by considering ﬁrst the properties for the epistemic operation of communication of (unveriﬁed, functional)
information constrained by the hierarchy of agents. Then we shall consider how to bridge this system with the additional
properties obtained by performing veriﬁcation. Finally, we will see which properties survive the upgrade to knowledge.
4.1. Properties of trusted communication
The weaker epistemic state involved in the process of communication corresponds in the type-theoretic setting to the use
of open (refutable) judgements xi : A in a dependent judgement. Such formula admits the inference to the i operator by
the modal formation rule in Deﬁnition 12. The informal meaning of the -Formation rule is therefore that if A is admissible
in the system, then someone has information about A. Notice that, being generated from the weaker true∗ predicate, this
rule keeps reliability separated from alethic properties, whence validity is not guaranteed. Informally, this tells us that
acceptance of contents is based on the trust relation among agents, without implying global truth of the communicated
messages.17 In the case of G = {1}, we have the admissibility of the formula
Autonomous Hypothesis Rule
Γ, xi : A, i(A true)
This rule expresses the basic property that agents trust themselves on admissible contents.18 This rule can be generalized
under hypotheses to admit a form of Reﬂexivity:
xi : A  A true∗
Reﬂexivity
Γ, xi : A, i(A true)
With G = {1, . . . ,n},n > 1, the basic requirement is that communications happen in a strictly ordered way, from higher to
lower positions in the trust hierarchy. Under this proviso, a communication formula xi : A is always taken to hold in the
context of information generated at Γi−1.
In the following, we shall abbreviate any formula of the form (A true) by J , followed by indices J ′, J ′′, . . . when we want
to refer to distinct contents (A, B, . . .) ∈ K. In turn, any modal judgement ◦i∈G(A true) | ◦ = {,} will be abbreviated by
16 Indices for agents can be compared intuitively to different states in a Kripke semantics. The context extension function works as a domain inclusion
assumption in relational Kripke structures: if M = (S,π,k1, . . . ,kn) is such a structure and (s, t) ∈ ki , according to the domain inclusion assumption
dom(π(s)) ⊆ dom(π(t)), i.e. one assumes that if the state t is connected from s, then the domain corresponding to s is a subset of the domain corresponding
to t , cf. [24, pp. 86–87]. Under this analogy, a context extension produces a subset of the overall domain on which evaluations are performed and the
formula ◦iΓ | ◦ j says that the contents in  are accessible from those in Γ , where the properties of such accessibility shall depend on the conﬁguration
given by ◦i and ◦ j .
17 This rule goes via the inference xi : A ⇒ A true∗ ⇒i(A true), generating a weaker form of the ‘vigilance’ property suggested in [21]. As we shall see
later on, the true predicate, on the other hand, enforces communication of true messages.
18 This is a basic weaker counterpart of ‘sincerity’ than what is admitted in [21].
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the abbreviated format  j(B true)[i(A true)], further simpliﬁed as k J [i J ′]. Whenever the content is intended to be the
same, we shall of course drop the index on judgements. Now we can use this simpliﬁed notation to deﬁne our notion of
Communication Chain:
Deﬁnition 16 (Communication Chain). For every message  J and agents G = {i < k}, either k J [i J ] and k = j, or there
is a j such that G = {i < j < k} and k J [ j J [i J ]]. We call the hierarchical relation between i, j,k ∈ G a Communication
Chain where k J relies on  j J , which relies on i J .
By this deﬁnition every communication is unidirectional (going top-down in the trust hierarchy) and compact (meaning
that messages are communicated among all agents present in the hierarchy).19 We can now use the notion of Communi-
cation Chain and its structure to unveil the deﬁnition of Trusted Communication, which is our formal counterpart to the
deﬁnition of Testimony given in Deﬁnition 2:
Deﬁnition 17 (Trusted Communication). We say that a Trusted Communication is a ternary relation TC = 〈i, j, J 〉, i < j ∈ G ,
holding between the epistemic state of the sender, that we indicate by the corresponding modal attitude expressed by i ,
the epistemic state of the receiver, equivalently indicated by the corresponding modal attitude expressed by  j , and a
content J . A TC is then enforced by a Communication Chain of the form  j J [i J ] and xi : A i J .
The ﬁrst and second element in the ternary relation are the epistemic states of the trustor and of the trustee towards
the content of J . This third element in the relation enforced by TC can be of course composed by distinct judgements
J , J ′ when J  J ′ . A generalization of this deﬁnition enforcing relations among sets of trustors and trustees can be given by
deﬁning identity over agents, starting from equality rules of contents deﬁned over the corresponding derivability relations:
agents i and j enforce the same set of TCs with respect to another agent k and a content J iff the derivability relations
indexed by i and k produce the same set of judgements as that indexed by j and k.20
By the deﬁnition of Communication Chain, a form of (ordered) Transitivity called Transmission is enforced:
xi : A  A true∗  j(B true)[i(A true)] k(B true)[ j(B true)]
Transmissioni(A true) k(B true)
It says that if Agent k trusts Agent j on J and Agent j holds J trusting Agent i on J ′ , then Agent k will also consider
Agent i trustworthy on J ′ (for (i < j < k ∈ G)). An example of this property on the trust relation can be formulated as
follows: a patient (agent k) trusts her doctor (agent j) to provide correct medical information and diagnosis ( J ); agent j
holds J because she trusts his studies (agent i) to have provided accurate information about how to formulate diagnoses;
then (though indirectly) agent k trusts agent i to provide accurate information about how to formulate diagnoses.21
Obviously, we do not want to admit that a trusted communication be reversible in the order of the signatures, to avoid
the validity of expressions of the following form: “If Agent j considers B true by trusting Agent i on the truth of A, then
Agent i considers A true by trusting Agent j on the truth of B”. Hence Symmetry for such a relation is not admitted, in
other words a trusted communication is a uni-directional relation.22 In this way, our trust relation is transitive only towards
sources, but not towards receivers.
The epistemic value of functional information as admissible (but unveriﬁed) content should be preserved under locally
valid modal contexts. This means that from a multi-context GΣ one infers possibility judgements. This validates the
following rules:
19 As we focus on a delivery system, i.e. on the message from the point of view of the receiver, we cannot grant that every message sent is successfully
received.
20 The restriction enforced by considering an occurrence of trust between two agents with respect to a content, perfectly endorses the deﬁnition of trust
relationship at runtime for information systems given in [76], where also the generalization to sets of agents is presented.
21 We model this property having in mind its semantic counterpart: the difference between Transmission and Transitivity is that whereas the former
is of the form KaKb p → Ka p, the latter takes the form Ka p → KbKa p, with a,b in the set of Agents and p a propositional content of information. [38,
Section 4.2] uses the term ‘Transmissibility’ to refer to such a property of communication. ‘Transmission’ is also used in the literature on the epistemology
of testimony, for instance [45] uses “transmission of epistemic properties” as a label for several theories of testimony. Notice that the transitivity of trust
only applies to identical tokens of information (in this case J ′), which guarantees that – in the previous example – agent i is trusted only with respect
to the communication of J ′ and not with respect to any other instance of information she may hold. This is a most needed property, which is formally
secured by the fact that the transmissions are deﬁned by dependencies of content generated by agents. Trust is then the property holding between agents
instantiating such transmissions. This means that trust between agents i, j,k is not generalized with respect to any other information item they might
possibly share. Transitivity as the basic property for generation of trust among unknown entities in information systems is studied in [40].
22 To put it in a rough comparison with the model developed in [18], we are not considering in this formal framework any ‘outputting trust’ relation, that
is the relation of trust relating the process of transmitting knowledge from the knowing to the accepting agent and the trust that the former has in the
latter. Nonetheless, the asymmetric nature of our model can be avoided in an obvious way, by deﬁning two distinct TC’s reversing the order of the indices
in the ﬁrst two elements of the triple.
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Γi | x j : A  B true∗
Multiple IGΣ i, j(B true)
iΓ | j i, j(A true)  j, xk : A  j,k(B true)
Multiple E
Γi |  j  B true∗
The ﬁrst rule is an instance of substitution of declarations within contexts with modal assumptions: by extending the
(either global or local) Γi with information accessible locally at source j, the judgement (B true) is preﬁxed by i, j , meaning
these sources are always to be called upon for the validity of B (i.e. B holds at their intersection). The corresponding
elimination starts from a similarly derivable judgement i, j(A true) to infer its variable constructor (which needs to be
located) and to obtain a well-formed  j,k(B true), then it infers that the initial conditions Γi |  j suﬃce to derive the local
validity of B (without the additional location of A). The multiplicity condition means that equivalent operations need to be
performed within Γi, j where necessary.
We can now reconnect these inference rules for  with the notion of Trusted Communication as given by Deﬁnition 17
in order to relate trusted information to derivable contents:
Deﬁnition 19 (Sequenced admissible communication). If l J [i J ′, . . . ,k Jn], we write i,kΣ l J and say that
1. judgement J is reachable at l (k  l ∈ G) from i,kΣ if there are trusted communications TC1 = 〈i, J 〉 up to TCn =
〈k,l, J , Jn〉 such that at TCk agent l trusts agents k on the content of Jn to infer the content of J , at TCk−1 agent k
trusts agents k − 1 on the content of Jn−1 to infer the content of Jn and so on up to TC1−k where agent i + 1 trusts
agent i on the content of J ′ to infer the content of J ′+1, and
2. Σi,k |l is admissible.
The ﬁrst condition says that an accessible informational content in a multi-modal context needs to be reachable from a
sequence of trusted communications among the ordered agents. The second condition says that the extension of the multi-
modal context by the communicated information needs to be admissible. As a lemma, we obtain that trusted communication
leads to admissibility:
Lemma 1 (Admissibility via Trusted Communication). Given i,kΣ l J , for G = {i < j < k} and TC = 〈i, . . . ,k, J 〉,
1. either Γi,k |  j is admissible, or
2. there are judgements 〈 j J ′, . . . ,k Jn〉 such that TC1 = 〈i, j, J j〉 up to TCn−1 = 〈 j,k, Jk〉 andl J [ j J ′, . . . ,k Jn].
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the length of the propositional contents (A, . . . ,N) ∈ Σ :
• k = 1 is satisﬁed by the Autonomous Hypothesis Rule, which also shows the two conditions to be not exclusive;
• where k > 1, there are at least k− 1 steps in trusted communication such that at the latter of these steps l J becomes
admissible in view of the multi-modal context Σ j,k . Each such step will consist of any of the rules for typeinf such that
the construction of  j,kΣ is preserved.23 
4.2. Bridging properties
The β-conversion rule listed for the typeinf kind is the syntactical rule that enforces veriﬁcation of communicated infor-
mation, giving the bridge from possibility to necessity contexts. Going in the other direction, a modal version of abstraction
on terms expresses communication of veriﬁed information, giving the bridge from necessity to possibility contexts. This
shows the basic interaction between the two forms of modal judgements that can be generated from type and typeinf
formulae. We list in the following the properties resulting from admitting this bridging among the two modalities.
Let us start from the latter case, obtained by the following -import rule:
iΓ,a j : A i, j(B true) x j : A  A true∗ -ImportiΓ, j(A true) i, j(B true)
23 Notice that Deﬁnition 19 and Lemma 1 give for our system what the deﬁnition of reachability in asynchronous message passing systems and
Lemma 4.5.2 give for message transmission in [24, p. 146].
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A, or in other words that each content derivable from an agent’s state can always be formulated in the weaker informational
state of the same agent.24 If we force the order relation to work in the rule and use accessibility to a new state in the ﬁrst
premise, we can provide an instance of the -Import rule that satisﬁes Common Seriality:
iΓ,a j : A k(B true) x j : A  A true∗
Common SerialityiΓ, j(A true) k(B true)
The intuitive meaning of Common Seriality is that each agent’s knowledge (conclusion of the ﬁrst premise) can be traced
back to some agent’s information (second premise and conclusion). Note that by Deﬁnition 16 where reﬂexivity holds, this
does not need to imply an inﬁnite chain. This intuitively refers to the path of trusted communications that links together
the agents in the hierarchy.25
The modal version of β-conversion is here reformulated as -Import:
Γi, x j : A  B true∗ a j : A  A true -ImportiΓ,a j : A i, j(B true)
obtained by an instance of the Premise Rule and -Formation.
If we look at the modal import rules, we obtain a description of our agents as informers consistent with their knowledge
and knowers consistent with their veriﬁed informations. Notice that information reduces to knowledge only provided that
for every fresh variable constructor xi of the typeinf on a -Import Rule, a new application of the β-Conversion Rule is
formulated such that the corresponding B typeinf in its second premise is reduced to its normal form B type and in the
conclusion every occurrence of i, j(B true) is reduced to i, j(B true).
To interpret the transmission of epistemic contents among distinct agents, we enforce a rule for communication of known
contents corresponding to convergence:
iΓ  A true  j(A true)[xi : A]
ConvergenceiΓ, xi : A  j(A true)
Informally, this rule says that if there is a knowledge obtained at i and j is informed about that (for the usual i < j
and using Common Seriality), then at i it is known that j is informed about that. Convergence satisﬁes Semi-Adjunction
(or Seriality, for the mono-modal B) as an instance, which means that the condition expressed by Convergence is strictly
stronger than Common Seriality, as it implies that knowledge is communicated and that communications are known: if
something is known to be communicated, then each agent knows that those lower in the trust hierarchy are informed
about it. Convergence ensures the transparency of the system, as it allows all the agents to know what content has been
communicated and at what level of the hierarchy.
4.3. Properties of knowledge
The validity of truth from  was already established by the Truth Deﬁnition in Deﬁnition 6, which implements an equiv-
alent of (standard) Axiom T , preserving Reﬂexivity, saying that any veriﬁed A is valid and hence admissible in any context.
In this case trust does no longer occur, as the receiving agent accepts a content A as true on the basis of its veriﬁcation.
Hence, in our model truth of contents is independent from the trust in the sender.
We rely on the basic property instantiated by the ﬁrst item in Deﬁnition 15, according to which k(A true) is derivable
from ∅ |  jΓ and hence Γ j | k is admissible for  = {k(A true)}. This deﬁnition implies the validity of (A true) at any
point in G , which establishes modal derivability under veriﬁcation:
Deﬁnition 20 (Rules for GΣ). The set of rules for working within a modal context GΣ are of the following form:
Γi | x j : A  A true∗ iΓ, [x j/a j] : A  A true
Multiple IGΣ G(A true)
iΓ | a j : A i, j(A true) G(A true) |k G(B true)
Multiple E
Γi | a j : A,k  B true
24 Hence, it provides a counterpart to the model-theoretic D axiom scheme α →α.
25 The relation between trusting agents and the occurrence of communication analyzed in [21] implements a cooperativity axiom that forces each belief
content to be communicated among trusting agents. From our Common Seriality Rule a much more reasonable property is obtained: where knowledge has
been achieved in the context of trusting agents, communication has been performed.
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by instantiation of all premises: in other words, we require that each term be valid at all sources accessible from within G .
This is the fundamental step towards the elaboration of CK, where all the known contents are equally accessible from any
agent in the system. Notice that in the base case of Σ = {∅}, this multi-modal rule becomes of the form 0,1, verifying the
Necessitation Rule. The corresponding elimination starts from a similarly derived G(B true) to decompose its conditions.
The multiplicity condition applies as in the corresponding rule for Σ . This explanation of knowledge makes the notion of
validity of a content A known by some agent i strictly dependent on data veriﬁcation that is accessible by i and equally
by any other agent involved in the knowledge process, but completely independent from any trust relation among those
agents.26
By a speciﬁc instance of derivability under nΣ , we show the admissibility of k(A true) by any Γi, j ∈ nΣ and
i < j < k ∈ G , from which follows Upper Inclusion, that is accessibility of valid contents at any higher point in G:
GΣ k(A true) i, jΣ | ak : A G(A true)
Upper InclusionGΣ i, j(A true)
The intuitive meaning of Upper Inclusion is that if an agent has some veriﬁed knowledge, then every other agent higher
in the trust hierarchy knows it. This is proven by relying on the assumption that locating the source of the proven con-
tent admissibility extends the initial contexts and is accessible directly from there. The converse Lower Inclusion expresses
accessibility of valid contents at any lower admissible point in G:
iΓ | j i, j(A true) i, jΣ k(A true)
Lower InclusionGΣ k(A true)
It establishes the same relation in the reverse order. Even though this might seem obvious in view of the deﬁnition of our operator, its actual explanation requires additionally that the lower point considered be in fact accessible, a requirement
satisﬁed implicitly by the second premise in the rule. This hidden requirement is to be made explicit on the basis of the
communication operation within knowledge, ensured by Common Seriality from the previous section.
Letting the Inclusion properties follow one another, validity implies admissibility at each point, which in turn says that
Equivalence holds:
iΓ i(A true)
EquivalenceiΓ | j i, j(A true)
to be read both top-down and bottom-up. If we take |G| > 2, we can also validate a version of Union:
iΓ | j k(A true)
UnionGΣ i, j,k(A true)
which is again readable in both directions and holds by the required multiple substitutions of i, j for GΣ in the Inclusion
rules and the Compactness property from Deﬁnition 16. Notice that by the multi-modal version of 1,2-Formation, we can
instantiate ordered iteration very easily:
iΓ | j k(A true)
Ascending IterationGΣ k(i, j(A true))
which says that if at k it is known that A is true in the context of reliable sources i, j, then in the same context it is known
at k that A being true is known at i, j (in other words, anything known at some point is known at that point to be known
at higher points). This is obtained by applying Common Seriality. The counterpart
iΓ | j k(A true)
Descending IterationGΣ i, j(k(A true))
says that if at k it is known that A is true in the context of reliable sources i, j, then in the same context it is known at i, j
that A is known to be true at k. This is easily derivable from Convergence and β-Reduction.27
26 The equivalence of veriﬁcation for any agent in the same group as the one actually issuing the proof-term is a necessary requirement to enforce a
sensible notion of knowledge and to avoid that either trusted communications be reduced only to refutable beliefs or a solipsist turn of the underlying
epistemology. This requirement is formally satisﬁed by α-conversion and our deﬁnition of the  operator.
27 The proof that the present type-theoretic language including both modalities actually correspond to a non-standard fragment of a modal Kripke se-
mantics is possible in view of a variant of the constructive modal logic introduced in [1]. Then the fragment containing only the  modality can be proven
equivalent to S4 models, whereas with the  operator it reduces to a contextual format of KT . This result is shown in ongoing research, see [63].
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The standard intuitive deﬁnition of Distributed Knowledge (DK) from epistemic logics says that a group has distributed
knowledge of proposition A if the combined knowledge of agents in the group implies A.28 The basic requirement is
therefore that not every item in the knowledge base is accessible to every agent involved in the reasoning process and that
therefore the deductive closure is performed ‘outside of the box’ to ﬁnd what all agents together might know (the ‘wise
man’ knowledge). In the case of knowledge processes based on a trust relation, in which the trustor justiﬁes a given content
relying on the justiﬁcation of some other content accessible only to the trustee, the group formed by (at least) two agents
involved by such relation can indeed be said to have distributed knowledge. In the present section we actually show that
a counterpart of the standard notion of Distributed Knowledge from Epistemic Logic is correctly satisﬁed by our multiple introduction rule for a modal context GΣ , which allows inference for the intersection of agents in G = {1, . . . ,n}. Once
this is proven to be the case, another obvious question arises concerning the counterpart notion of Common Knowledge
(see especially [34] and [24]): in particular, we shall see that the presence of relations of Trusted Communications represent
an actual limitation to the acquisition of Common Knowledge and that our GΣ,G = {1, . . . ,n} can indeed be deﬁned as
Common Knowledge operator.
Consider two signed contexts, by now without any priority relation deﬁned over them29:
iΓ = {(S true),(T true),(U → ⊥ true)}
 j = {(S true),(U true),(T → ⊥ true)}
Distributed Knowledge of ΣG = {Γi |  j} implies:
GΣ i, j(S true)
obtained by eliminating in Γi the open variables that are no longer satisﬁable when Γ j is taken as a possible extension,
and vice versa. Recalling that DK is obtained as an inference relation between non-reciprocally accessible epistemic states
(the ‘wise-man’), we use the structural properties of possibility contexts to mimic the accessibility from inside the language.
Strictly speaking, the resulting content would still need to be veriﬁed (β-reduced) to turn it into proper knowledge, but up
to any further contextual extension being considered, this would remain the only shared content among the involved states,
hence to be considered as their ‘knowledge’. This induces our next result:
Theorem 1 (G as a distributed knowledge operator).
GΣ i, j(A true) iff Γi |  j  A true for any (i, j) ∈⋂G
Proof. To show that our G operator corresponds indeed to the derivability under two distinct indices, and hence is a DK
operator, it is enough to recall that G satisﬁes in some form the standard properties for DK: Distribution is induced by
Deﬁnitions 12 and 18; Reﬂexivity by the corresponding rule from Section 4.1; Transitivity holds in its ordered backward
format by Transmission, whereas Seriality holds only when taken in the context of communication, i.e. with its relation
to our -modality. The application of appropriate β-reductions leads the set of valid formulae to those derivable in the
axiomatization that is sound and complete with respect to Reﬂexivity and Transitivity. The characteristic standard properties
of Distributed Knowledge are easily satisﬁed. For DK in |G| = {1}, DK in G is equivalent to just dependent knowledge:
iΓ i(A true)
DK1G=iΣ G=i(A true)
which can be read in both top-down and bottom-up directions. For extensions of G , the larger a G ⊆ G′ the greater the
distributed knowledge of G′:
iΓ i(A true) iΓ | j G=i, j(A true)
DKi⊂ jG=i ⊆G=i, j(A true)
which is simply satisﬁed by the deﬁnition of admissible context extension. 
Notice that by this deﬁnition, which mimics inclusions by single step contextual extensions, the order of the signatures
plays no role, as the pair of agents is not an ordered pair. In the general argument, where |G| > {2}, each single pair
of agents needs to be considered in descending order: as Transitivity works only backwards, for every i,k(A true) and
i < j < k ∈ G , there must be TCs’ such that i, j(A true) and  j,k(A true).
28 See [24].
29 The following example is adapted accordingly from [24, p. 24].
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number of TC in the system is reduced to zero.30
Theorem 2 (Trusted Communication as a bound to CK). Suppose that Σ = 〈◦i,◦ j, J , J ′〉 and i < j. Then for all judgements J ∈ Σ ,
Σ  J iff TC j = 0.
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the structure of Σ .
• The base case for J = 1, i = j corresponds to a Derivation with just one step by the Autonomous Hypothesis Rule and
no admissible extension of the relevant context taken into account. This satisﬁes by deﬁnition the validity of J into all
contexts, it reduces TC j = 0 and by Deﬁnition 15 allows for i J .
• Where J = 1, i = j, we are considering a Derivation with at most one application of multiple I- rule, and the extension
is admissible since by hypothesis |G|  2. By application of the rule and the construction from Deﬁnition 17, TC j = 1
and G J . From the conclusion of this derivation, I- can be applied to make the extension everywhere accessible,
which is the only rule to allow inference of G J and hence of i J . From the latter, TC j is reduced to zero.
• Where J = 1, i = j, the case is similar to the previous one, with at least one application of multiple I- rule and
TC j = | J − 1|. The previous procedure applies to any occurrence of such a derivation step with | J − 1| applications of
I-. 
This theorem says something slightly stronger than what holds for asynchronous message passing systems where unre-
liable communication is used. It says that nothing becomes common knowledge unless it is also knowledge in the absence
of trusted communication, i.e. common knowledge does not hold if the communication chain is not reduced to veriﬁability
at each point. We can now formulate our ﬁnal result:
Theorem 3 (G as a common knowledge operator).
GΣ i, j(A true) iff Γi  A true for all i ∈ G
Proof. The standard properties of CK are satisﬁed by the deﬁnition of G J as holding iff ∅ | Γi∈G  J , which expresses
admissibility of contexts extensions within G:
• CK is equivalent to its conjunction with the fact that everyone in G knows: use Lemma 1 on the admissibility of Trusted
Communication and multiple I-, by which every source needs to be admissible and its β-redex induces the  operator.
• If ΣG  J and this implies Γi ⊆ Σ  ( J ∧ J ′) for every i ∈ G , then GΣ G J ′ , which is proven again by induction: for
|G| = 1 this requires only the admissibility of Γi  J , this will imply by hypothesis Γi  ( J ∧ J ′), and hence by deﬁnitioniΓ i J ′ . If |G| > 1, then there is TCk−1 which makes Γi | k admissible. As by the previous argument, if the context
extension is admissible, Γi | k  ( J ∧ J ′) and by I- we have i,kΣ i,k J ′ . 
A comparison is due with the results for Justiﬁed Common Knowledge presented in [4]. The notion of Justiﬁed knowl-
edge in the form a modal operator Jφ (φ is justiﬁed) is the forgetful projection of an evidence assertion t : φ [4, p. 12].
This operator for common knowledge is deﬁned in a language which contains multi-modalities, as for our G operator
and it satisﬁes the Fixed-Point Axiom in each of the fragment of modal logics Tn, S4n, S5n . This represents the ﬁrst basic
distinction with our operator for common knowledge: as we deal with a constructive language, the iteration of operators
is restricted to positive introspection, hence Axiom 5 (respectively, Symmetricity on frames) is not validated. Moreover, the
validity of Reﬂexivity is considered in the two fragments of the language, the one that admits only i operator, the other
where expression with i operators are considered; in the latter case the corresponding axiom is taken in its appropri-
ate formulation Tn . Finally, soundness and completeness are obviously proven in different ways, as the logic of Justiﬁed
Common Knowledge is presented in the ﬁrst place as a modal logic, and then a Gentzen–Hilbert-style system is introduced.
6. Properties on modal frames for trusted communications and knowledge
In this section we sketch completeness results of our rules w.r.t. corresponding modal frames. In terms of Kripke struc-
tures, our modal operators G and G will have to be deﬁnable in terms of modal frames F : 〈K,R〉 with a nonempty set
30 In [24, p. 149], Theorem 4.5.4 proves the impossibility to gain or lose CK in an interpreted asynchronous message passing systems. Provided the
appropriate identities between a run and message events with respectively a Communication Chain and the number of Trusted Communications in our
system, it follows the identity of the two theorems for the acquisition of CK . It also follows from the deﬁnition of CK as knowledge of every agent in an
interpreted system with more than one agent, see [34, Section 3].
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ensured; R = {R1, . . . , Rn} represent the set of indexed binary relations for each pair of modalities i, j in a TC and i, j .
Let us start with a Kripke model M which valuates the primitive propositions derivable under /GΣ . This will turn out
to be a non-standard model sound and complete with the multi-modal version of KT31:
Kn

i(A ⊃ B) → (i A ⊃i B)
Tn

A →i A
4<n Modus Ponens  ji A →i A
Here all occurrences of i operators have been substituted by a i , we obtain a correspondence with an S4-model. We
show in the following how the rules satisfy corresponding properties on frames.
We start with the Reﬂexivity Rule:
Lemma 2 (Reﬂexivity over States). For every derivation Γi−n i(A true), A true∗ ⇒i(A true) is a reﬂexive relation over A.
Proof. Reﬂexivity in our modal models means that for every state Ki corresponding to one indexed modality, it holds
Ki Ri Ki . This means that constructing the appropriate relation in a canonical model for i(A true), if Ki  A then Ki i A.
This corresponds to our A true∗ ⇒ i(A true). To prove that this holds, suppose by contradiction that given Ki  A then
Ki A: so Ki ¬A, then A becomes not admissible at i, i.e. there is no context extension Γ |  that validates i(A true)
so that Ki  A, contrary to the hypothesis. Hence A true∗ ⇒ i(A true) holds, and the rule corresponds to Ki Ri Ki for
states. 
Let us consider now Transmission. Its meaning is reﬂected by a backward ordered transitivity relation:
Lemma 3 (Backward Ordered Transitivity over States). For every derivation Γi  j(A true), i j(A true) ⇒i(A true) is a (back-
ward only) ordered transitive relation over A.
Proof. Backward Transitivity in our modal models can be explained as follows: for every Ki, K j, Kk if KkRkK j and K j R j Ki ,
then KkRi Ki ; in other words, if K j  A and Ki R j K j , then it holds Ki  A. As the accessibility relation is mimicked in
the derivability relation, this simulates the iteration i j and it implies the reduction to the lower indexed state. This is
what implemented by our 4<n axiom. Let us show that Transitivity does not hold forward. Its validity means that for every
Ki, K j, Kk if Ki Ri K j and K j R j Kk , then Ki RkKk , or in other words, if Ki A it holds K j A for every R j and hence  A.
Let now M be a model based on F such that Ki A, and which still satisﬁes Kk ¬A. This is still possible as Symmetry
fails (see step 2 in the proof of the following Lemma 4); this model still satisﬁes Ki  A. Such M is not transitive, and
neither can F be. 
It follows that frames for G are (only) reﬂexive:
Lemma 4 (Frames forGΣ). For every judgement A true such that Γk,k i(A true) holds implementing a Communication Chain
as by Deﬁnition 16, there is a model M  A such that for every frame F : 〈K,R〉 on which M is based, F is reﬂexive.
Proof. 1. Reﬂexivity is immediate by Lemma 2.
2. Symmetry means that if K j A, then Ki  A. It is not diﬃcult to show that if K j A, then Ki ¬A can still be
obtained, so that symmetry fails. Suppose K j A, and Ki Ri K j , i.e. there is an admissible TC ending with  j ; then there
is no admissible step that implies  A, for any TC, therefore it is still admissible a TCk = 〈 j,k,¬A〉, hence Ki ¬A and
Ki  A, contrary to the hypothesis.
3. Backward ordered transitivity is immediate by Lemma 3; by the same lemma general Transitivity fails. 
Theorem 4. Rules for ourG operator are sound and complete to models of KTn4<n.
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 2 and 4 and standard argument of soundness and completeness of KT4 for reﬂexive frames
adapted for the T axiom and restricted over the axiom 4. 
Similarly, we sketch here the proof that establishes the models of formulas derivable under the G to be sound and
complete with respect to the modal logic S4n . For this we need the following:
31 It is a fragment of the constructive contextual modal logic introduced in [1]. A full analysis of the conditions on frames for such semantics is presented
in [63].
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Proof. Transitivity in our modal models means that for every Ki, K j, Kk if Ki Ri K j and K j R j Kk , then Ki RkKk , or in other
words, if Ki  A it holds K j  A for every R j and hence  A. By I rule, Kk  A holds as well by deﬁnition and
properties of our operator. Now transitivity holds over any index and iteration is both ascending and descending. 
Lemma 6 (Reﬂexive and Transitive Frames for GΣ). For every judgement A true such that Γk,k i(A true) holds implementing
a Communication Chain as by Deﬁnition 16, there is model M  A such that for every frame F : 〈K,R〉 on which M is based, F is
reﬂexive and transitive.
Proof. Immediate, by preservation of Reﬂexivity by GΣ and Lemma 5. 
Theorem 5. Rules for our G operator are sound and complete to models of S4n.
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 5 and 6 and standard argument of soundness and completeness of S4 for reﬂexive and
transitive frames. 
7. Discussion
The debate on testimony is wide and heterogeneous, and different analyses have been provided from a variety of points
of view, e.g. in the debate between reductionism and anti-reductionism or within the framework of social epistemology [6,
32,33] and [27]. Many of the contributions to the debate on testimony agree in considering it linked in some way to trust,
see for example [12,35,75,69,31,7] and [41]. Trust has been considered the source of epistemic justiﬁcation for the receiver
of the message to believe the communicated message to be true. This is a problematic thesis; even once this is accepted
other problems arise, since one has not explained yet whether and how trust can provide such a justiﬁcation, and what
the reasons are that justify R ’s decision to trust S in transmitting true messages. In our approach, we explicitly distinguish
between contents that are presented together with their justiﬁcation and contents transmitted without.
This distinction is formally justiﬁed and it allows for implicitly endorsing a notion of trust in the language. In this paper
we have analyzed the relation between testimony and trust on the basis of the deﬁnition of trust put forward in [72], where
it is argued that testimony is an occurrence of a ﬁrst-order relation of communication affected by the second-order property
of trust, and the view is defended that an epistemic agent can acquire some knowledge, on the basis of the information
communicated through testimony, if and only if the agent is able to connect the transmitted information to the conceptual
network of interrelation to which it belongs.32 In the present context, we have translated acquisition of knowledge in
terms of veriﬁcation processes that survive network extensions. The notion of trust as a second-order property remains the
crucial theoretical feature on which the calculus is constructed, something that clearly differs from most well-known formal
treatment of trust as in [19].
The notion of communication as presented in the context of processes of group knowledge has found its formal explana-
tion mostly in multi-agent epistemic logics, see [24,54], and their various modal and dynamic translations, see [8,22]. These
systems have recently been extended to accommodate various interpretations of the notions of trust and testimony. The
current approaches privilege the interpretation of trust as a modal operator ranging over agents (“Agent a trusts agent b”),
and the corresponding informal explanation can vary. The formal treatment is mostly model-theoretic. In [9], trust relations
are modeled in terms of graphs designed over the plausibility models for belief revision: this has led to a different task,
namely a dynamic deﬁnition of doxastic merging states by sharing information via acts of sincere communication in [10],
stressing the property of reliable communication. The notion of sincerity of a communication act is deﬁned as sharing of
information that was already accepted by the speaker; reliability is deﬁned in terms of the notion of (common) knowledge.
Notice here the crucial distinction with our system: in our language both sincerity and reliability are informal properties
that can only be induced in terms of entirely well-deﬁned syntactical procedures of veriﬁcation, and the notion of common
knowledge is derived.
A variant of this model-theoretic approach is presented in [39], where a dynamic testimonial logic combines a con-
ditional doxastic logic and a dynamic logic of belief upgrade, enriched with a belief suspension operator: in this setting
so-called “authority graphs” are designed to capture agents’ epistemic trust in other agents’ testimony. The latter property
is embedded in the derivability relation of our language, which presents a more rigid notion of hierarchy for authorities,
but which comes for free with the structure of our contexts.
Another propositional dynamic logic approach to trust and commitment is presented in [13], in which the violation
of stronger commitments results in higher loss of trustworthiness than the violation of weaker ones, hence describing an
agent that proposes and accepts engagements in commitments, and violates them by performing actions other than the
32 Such a thesis is supported by Floridi’s Network Theory of Account (NTA), see [25] and [26, Chapter 12].
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dynamics proper of Martin-Löf’s Type Theory.
Another recent modal approach that combines the analysis of belief states with the reliability of information sources is
presented in [47]. In this framework, agents are allowed to keep track of the information sources via a signature system
that recalls ours, but the hierarchical structure these sources form is entirely different, as it orders sources from the more
to the less reliable and in this way allows agents to select information and to adapts her own belief state on that basis. This
is certainly a very interesting dynamic to explore on the representation of sources and it would be a step forward in adding
conceptual complexity to our model.
What all these models are characterized by is the usual intuition that belief states are basically not different from
knowledge states, so that their epistemic notions are indistinguishable, contrary to what we aim at in our model. Another
approach in the same direction as ours is represented by the debate on trust for theories of defeasible knowledge (see
e.g. [11]).
The notion of trust has received attention especially in the study of information systems and distributed computing.
We have already mentioned that our system can be easily transformed in an operational semantics, using the underlying
Curry–Howard isomorphism which establishes the proofs-as-programs and propositions- or formulae-as-types interpretation
(see [71] for a complete presentation). Let us in the following compare with some of the systems present in the literature.
The task in [44] is to provide computational declarative deﬁnitions for trust relations between interacting agents as
ﬁrst-order predicates, where the group of mutually trusting agents form the trust domain in a distributed system, and to
obtain computational complexity results for deciding trust relationships. Informally the relation of trust is given as belief
or knowledge of behavior’s predictability. From the computational point of view, this task is speciﬁed in the context of
web-based applications and computer-communication networks. Our contribution aims at providing a more general deﬁ-
nition to the epistemic notion of trust. Deﬁning it as a second-order relation we implicitly maintain that using a set of
atomic propositions to refer to agent’s correctness as the object of trust implies the impossibility of making a distinction
between different properties such that the same agent is correct about one, and incorrect about the other. One can still
avoid such a problem by naming explicitly the object of trust, as it is indeed done in [44] by adding naming in the form
correctPKI correctWebOfTrust, but this seems a complication from a theoretical viewpoint and the solution we propose seems
more elegant. Moreover, according to the latter system, the distinction among the agents’ epistemic states involved in the
trust relation is completely irrelevant: by means of a trust relation, knowledge of P holding for agent a induces knowledge
of P in agent b, so that trust is just a function for selecting communicating agents. Our language uses a dependency relation
to characterize trustworthy communications of contents between agents, whereas in the semantic approaches mentioned,
the communication is usually taken meta-theoretically, or can be added via an additional predicate that would take the
form (comm(b, P ,a)), hence requiring the second-order level if that has to be given the property of trust (namely via an
additional predicate of the form Trust(comm(b, P ,a))).
A procedural notion of trust, loosely based on the general analysis given in [52], is presented in [16]: it gives an agent-
based, degree-oriented notion of trust that allows interaction among entities and enforces transmission of such a property,
but it lacks both a restriction over the object of trust – because it is given as a function over agents – and the epistemic
analysis of the agents’ states that we include as central to our deﬁnition.
A recent approach is the generalization of the interpretation from [21] of trust based on mental attitudes given in the
already mentioned [19], where it is stated: “only a cognitive agent can trust another agent; only an agent endowed with goals
and belief ” (p. 38). The latter is then combined with the degree-based quantitative approach, see [19, Chapter 3]. The same
conceptual qualitative tools used in this latter approach to analyze trust and reputation, namely goal, capability, power, and
willingness, have been used in a multi-agent setting to evaluate agents’ behavior in the scope of collective beliefs, see [36].
This approach is reﬁned in [37], using a logic of time, action, beliefs and choices and by distinguishing occurrent trust from
dispositional trust.
Another model of formalization of trust relations based on modal logics is given in [46], where the relationship among
belief, information acquisition and trust is both semantically and axiomatically characterized so that belief and information
acquisition operators are respectively represented by KD45 and KD normal modalities, whereas trust is denoted by a modal
operator with minimal semantics. This framework is further extended in [20] to include the derivation of trust from other
notions. To do so, extensions with respect to relevance of topics and questions are introduced.
In [74], trust is a function deﬁned between a host and a client over a set of actions and a set of effects of such actions,
and such that it holds if the expectations of the host about the effects of the actions of the client are positive. This might
be seen as a notion similar to ours, where we focus especially on positive epistemic actions, but its structure appears less
informative from the point of view of epistemic states (it misses the doxastic representation).
A different approach to trust for distributed systems is presented in [76], based on set-theoretic operations deﬁned over
a quadruple composed by the set of trustors, the one of trustees, one of conditions and one of properties. The intended
meaning is that under a given set of circumstances (conditions), the set of trustors trust the set of trustees about a given
set of properties, the latter partitioned in a set of actions and a set of attributes. This strategy seems similar to our deﬁnition
of trust as a second-order property, but the main difference is that their notion of trust is a primitive and ours is restricted
to the declarative assertion of holding of a given property, hence focusing in the ﬁrst place on a message-passing system.
A formal semantics for ontologies that focuses in particular on transitivity of trust relations is given in the already
mentioned [40].
112 G. Primiero, M. Taddeo / Journal of Applied Logic 10 (2012) 92–114Along with the powerful model-theoretic treatments, different proof-theories have been adapted recently to an appro-
priate multi-agent setting to deﬁne group-based notions of knowledge: a natural deduction non-epistemic language in [28],
a Gentzen’s style sequent calculus in [58] and, at least for the syntactic intuition behind it, the already largely mentioned
Artemov’s logic of proofs. We are moreover aware of some yet unpublished work on the formalization of group knowl-
edge via hypersequent systems. The added value of these systems is given by their ability to represent different knowledge
modalities to sort among the contents and to make explicit the formulation of the information sources. Among these syn-
tactic approaches, our formal system provides an original treatment of trusted communications, to our knowledge the ﬁrst
doing so explicitly for human-like messaging systems that adopts a type-theoretic interpretation. The multi-modal extension
of our type-theory is derived from the mono-modal case formulated in [65] and motivated by problems similar to those
inspiring other formulations of modal type theories, such as in [61] and [57]. They all have different applications, especially
to Distributed and Staged Computation, see [56,55,66]. Among other calculi that treats explicitly the notion of trust for
computing, let us here just remember: a process calculus for trust management in [17]; the machinery used for the formal
veriﬁcation of security protocols applied to security and trust processes in [48].
The body of further work that converges on this topic from philosophy, (formal) epistemology and computer science is
impressive and we have given reference only to those works that most directly relate to this contribution.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a formal model for epistemic processes qualiﬁed by trust. It relies on two basic novelties,
strictly related to each other: the ﬁrst is that we consider trust as a second-order property that characterizes relations
of communications; the second is that so qualiﬁed relations are presented in a type-theoretic system that fully allows
for their formalization. By considering trust as a second-order relation, we avoid formalizing it at the same level of the
underlying epistemic relation: in the present formulation, trust has been formally deﬁned as a function over epistemic
states and affecting a propositional content. An obvious advantage of the here introduced language is that it makes possible
the representation of multi-agent interactions and it is embedded into the syntactical equivalent of a non-homogeneous
language for modal operators, allowing the representation of the central notions of Common and Distributed Knowledge.
A further step in this research will be represented by a consistent extension of this analysis to the cases of communications
characterized by mistrust and distrust.
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